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Impact of Demographic Changes on 
Inflation and the Macroeconomy† 
By JONG-WON YOON, JINILL KIM AND JUNGJIN LEE* 
Ongoing demographic changes have brought about a substantial shift 
in the size and age composition of the population, which are having a 
significant impact on the global economy. Despite potentially grave 
consequences, demographic changes usually do not take center stage 
in many macroeconomic policy discussions or debates. This paper 
illustrates how demographic variables move over time and analyzes 
how they influence macroeconomic variables such as economic 
growth, inflation, savings and investment, and fiscal balances, from an 
empirical perspective. Based on empirical findings—particularly 
regarding inflation—we discuss their implications on macroeconomic 
policies, including monetary policy. We also highlight the need to 
consider the interactions between population dynamics and 
macroeconomic variables in macroeconomic policy decisions. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
emographic change is one of the most important determinants of the future 
economic and social landscape. Many researchers have looked into how 
changes in the size and composition of an economy’s population influence 
macroeconomic outcomes. The channels through which demographic changes 
affect an economy typically include savings and investment behaviors, labor 
market decisions, and aggregate demand and supply responses. In the medium to 
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long term, both changes in the labor supply and changes in productivity—either 
viewed as exogenous or caused by demographic changes—could significantly alter 
an economy’s aggregate supply and thereby economic growth, as demographic 
changes affect the amount and combination by which its factor inputs are utilized. 
Over the short term, demographic transitions are likely to affect aggregate demand 
given that the amount of consumption and investment would depend critically on 
structural changes in the population’s age-earnings profiles. 
This paper intends to analyze the macroeconomic effects of demographic 
changes from an empirical perspective and to discuss their policy implications—
particularly regarding inflation. Effects of demographic changes would depend on 
the extent of the anticipation of the demographic changes, nominal and real 
friction, institutional aspects, and behavioral responses. For example, aggregate 
supply or demand responses may be more flexible when demographic changes are 
fully anticipated in advance. Macroeconomic dynamics would also be based on the 
specific types of friction assumed to that are built into a model. In an economy with 
significant bottlenecks to deter real or nominal adjustments, aggregate supply 
responses are more likely to lag aggregate demand responses, leading to slower 
output and price adjustments from the supply side. 
We attempt to identify the impact of demographic changes on inflation and the 
macroeconomy using two types of proxies to capture demographic changes. 
Changes in the total size of the population are captured by its growth rate. With 
regard to the composition of the population, multiple measures have been proposed 
to reflect the degree of population aging, such as the percentages of the working-
age and elderly in the population, dependency ratios, and life expectancy. We 
follow earlier empirical work based on these proxies and identify empirical 
evidence on the impact of demographic changes on economic growth, savings and 
investment, the external current account balance, and the fiscal balance. Monetary 
aspects of economic outcomes have received less attention in analyses of 
demographic changes; here, we pay particular attention to how inflation behavior is 
affected by demographic changes. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a number of stylized facts 
pertaining to the driving forces of demographic changes and their projections into 
the near future, including fertility and mortality ratios, population growth, and the 
shares of the working-age and elderly in the population. Section 3 provides a brief 
review of the related literature, covering both theoretical and empirical discussions 
of the impact of demographic changes on macroeconomic variables, including 
inflation. In Section 4, we elaborate on the data, methodology, and empirical 
findings with regard to inflation and the macroeconomic impact of demographic 
changes. The final section concludes the paper and offers some discussion on 
policy implications. 
 
 
II. Description of Demographic Changes 
 
The world is about to experience a drastic shift in the size and composition of 
the population. Such demographic changes have already begun in some countries, 
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including Japan, and will become conspicuous for many other countries in the 
coming decades. Two fundamental driving forces that underlie such demographic 
changes are related to birth and death, i.e., fertility and mortality.1 According to 
work published by the United Nations (United Nations 2014), the total fertility rate 
was around 5 on average around the world in the 1960s. This number has decreased 
consistently over the last fifty years and is currently around 2.5. It is projected to 
settle just above 2 by the end of the 21st century.2 
There is, however, a significant difference between more developed areas and 
less developed regions, as illustrated in Figure 1. The fertility rate was as high as 
about 6 around 1960 in less developed regions, and in such regions the fertility rate 
is currently higher than the world average. Even in the 1950s, the fertility rate in 
more developed areas was less than 3 and currently; it has remained below 2 for 
nearly thirty years, since approximately 1985. Over the long term, the United 
Nations projects this to move back up to around 2. 
Figure 2 provides information about country-wide total fertility rates for several 
countries. The fertility rate for five industrialized countries (the US, the UK, 
France, Germany, and Japan) remained between 2 and 4 in the 1950s and 60s and 
has fluctuated around 2 from the 1970s onward. However, in Korea in the 1950s 
through to the 1970s, the fertility rate exceeded 4 before taking a rapid downward 
trajectory afterward.3 It dropped to less than 2 in the 1990s before stabilizing at 
 
 
FIGURE 1. TOTAL FERTILITY RATE (CHILDREN PER WOMAN) 
Source: UN Population Prospects, 2012 revision. 
 
1While past variations in birth/death rates or immigration factors may also trigger demographic changes, they 
were not included in the description given their relatively weak significance. 
2 Our assessments are based solely on baseline projections according to the United Nations (2014). 
Demographic trends could change depending on various policy efforts, such as those affecting immigration. 
3Japan and Korea were emphasized based on their rapid population aging and lowest fertility levels. China, 
the country with the largest population in the world, has also been experiencing significant demographic changes, 
similar to those of Korea, during the last few decades, as summarized in Figure A1.  
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approximately 2 since then. In particular, Korea’s fertility rate has remained 
significantly below 1.5 in the last couple of decades and declined recently to about 
1.2, one of the lowest rates in the world. 
Besides the decrease in the fertility rate, mortality has been another factor 
affecting recent demographic changes. Figure 3 captures the change in mortality by 
life expectancy as averaged over a cohort group born each year. The world-average 
 
 
FIGURE 2. TOTAL FERTILITY BY MAJOR ECONOMIES (CHILDREN PER WOMAN) 
Source: UN Population Prospects, 2012 revision. 
 
 
FIGURE 3. LIFE EXPECTANCY (YEARS AT BIRTH) 
Source: UN Population Prospects, 2012 revision. 
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life expectancy of someone who was born in 1955 is close to 50 years, while life 
expectancy for more developed regions is significantly above 60 years. The life 
expectancy increases as we move to later cohorts, as one would expect. The 
increase in life expectancy, together with the decrease in the fertility rate as shown 
in Figures 1 and 2, caused both a change in the size of the world population and an 
aging phenomenon in the composition of the population. 
The demographic consequences brought about by the above drivers include 
changes in the size and the composition of the population. Elevated fertility rates in 
the 1950s and 60s—combined with an increase in life expectancy—caused the 
population to grow, and the growth rate picked up as well in more developed 
countries. Figure 4 shows that the growth rate of the total population has been 
following a decreasing trend since then. Though the population growth rate will 
remain in the positive range for the world as a whole according to United Nations 
projections, the total population growth for the OECD in total is expected to enter 
negative territory around 2050. In particular, Figure 4 indicates that the total 
population began to decline in Japan from 2009, and this occurred in Germany 
from the mid-2000s with Korea expected to follow suit from the mid-2030s. Such 
declines in the population size could have disproportionate ramifications on the 
macroeconomy.  
Having as much influence on macroeconomic dynamics as the size of population 
is the composition of the population. Figure 5 displays changes in the share of the 
working-age population relative to the total population. High fertility rates in the 
1950s and 60s were in the background of an increasing trend in the working-age 
share of the total population in OECD countries until shortly after 2000. Since then, a 
decrease in fertility and an increase in longevity have caused the working-age 
population share to decline steadily. We can observe the turnaround in the trend of 
the working age population share in the recent decade, which divides the rising 
  
 
FIGURE 4. TOTAL POPULATION GROWTH (PERCENT) 
Source: UN Population Prospects, 2012 revision. 
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FIGURE 5. WORKING-AGE POPULATION SHARE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION (PERCENT) 
Source: UN Population Prospects, 2012 revision. 
 
trend until the 1990s and the declining trend from about the 2010s. The declines in 
working-age population share are particularly rapid in Japan and Korea, where the 
total fertility rates have declined very rapidly. 
Along with the working-age population share, the dependency ratio has received 
much attention in macroeconomics—especially in the public finance literature 
involving pension systems. As shown in Figure 6, the dependency ratio is almost a 
mirror image of the share of the working-age population. Around the turn of the 
century, the dependency ratio overall was close to 50%; this number for Korea was 
as low as 40%. The dependency ratio is projected to increase steadily over time—
reaching about 100% for the case of Japan and Korea by 2100. The share of the 
working age population or the elderly dependency ratio indicates that a significant 
change in the population structure has been occurring since the 2000s which could 
have important economic implications with regard to the macroeconomy.4 
As a starting point for understanding the effects of demographic changes on 
macroeconomic outcomes, we can plot the relationship between demographic 
variables (elderly share, working-age share, and population growth) and macro 
variables (per capita real GDP growth, saving/GDP, investment/GDP, current 
account/GDP, budget balance/GDP, and inflation). If we draw scatter plots for 
pooled data (both cross-section and time-series)—as shown in Figure A2, A3, and 
A4—the relationship is not significant, except for government revenue and 
expenditure. This is not unexpected, as pooled data averages out over countries and 
over time. It is therefore imperative to conduct a panel analysis based on certain 
 
4The EU Aging Report is another source that covers demographic projections —up to the year 2060—where, 
for example, the dependency ratio in Germany converges to around 85% by then. UN projections suggest a further 
increase to around 90% by 2100. 
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FIGURE 6. DEPENDENCY RATIOS FOR MAJOR ECONOMIES 
Source: UN Population Prospects, 2012 revision. 
 
country- or time-specific structures on the macroeconomic effects of demographic 
changes. 
 
III. Literature Review 
 
A proper analysis of the macroeconomic effects of demographic changes is 
crucial when exploring appropriate policy responses to minimize the adverse 
effects or unwanted distortions. Reflecting their grave consequences, there have 
been extensive studies analyzing various aspects of demographic changes which 
affect an economy, covering real, external, fiscal, and financial ramifications. There 
have been broadly two approaches which have been used to analyze the 
macroeconomic impact of demographic changes. The standard approach assumes 
constant age-specific behavior with respect to employment, earnings, consumption 
and savings and assesses the implications of demographic changes. While this 
approach is useful for capturing what are known as the accounting effects of 
demographic transitions, the outcomes could be misleading, as economic behaviors 
can be altered and institutional aspects can be adjusted. The other approach takes 
into account the behavioral, institutional, and global responses as well. This 
approach adds a measure of complexity in order to track various channels and their 
interactions. However, it allows relative richness in its analysis by including 
reactions to aging-induced price changes, international diversification, and policy 
changes. 
On the macroeconomics side, demographic issues have been most widely 
addressed in the context of economic growth. In the textbook treatment of growth 
theories, the growth rate of the population is considered to be exogenous and serves 
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as a starting point for growth in real activities. Both population growth and 
population aging are relevant when determining real interest rates and inflation as 
well. In particular, the dependency of the (equilibrium) real interest rate on 
population dynamics is contingent on how population dynamics are incorporated 
into the utility specification. In an infinite-horizon model with a growing household 
size, the real interest rate may or may not depend on the growth rate of the 
population.5 This ambiguity will be a source of difficulty when determining a 
desirable response by monetary policies in a world of changes in population growth 
in the medium to short term. 
Empirical evidence of the growth effect has been studied extensively.6 This 
includes such channels as lower labor inputs, a potential negative impact due to 
increasing tax and contribution burdens, savings and investment, and productivity. 
The demographic impact on aggregate real GDP is somewhat straightforward 
when the population is growing, declining or aging given the direct implication on 
the size of labor inputs, while its impact on per capita real GDP is less so, 
attracting attention for analysis. For example, Chapter 3 of the 2004 World 
Economic Outlook by Callen et al. (2004) found that per capita GDP growth is 
positively correlated with changes in the working age population share but is 
negatively correlated with changes in the elderly share. Based on the 
decomposition of real GDP growth into productivity and changes in labor input due 
to both population growth and aging, Choi et al. (2014) also shows that the 
impending demographic change in Korea has a negative impact on real GDP 
growth.7 However, Bloom, Cunning, and Fink (2010) find that population aging 
will tend to lower labor force participation and savings rates, raising concern about 
a slowing of economic growth, but behavioral responses (including greater female 
labor-force participation) and policy reforms (including an increase in the legal age 
of retirement) can mitigate the adverse economic consequences of an older 
population.8 
Population growth affects other real variables as well. The influence of 
demographic variables has been investigated in the context of the following key 
economic variables, in addition to growth in real GDP per capita. These include 
savings- and investment-to-GDP ratios, the current account-to-GDP ratio, and the 
budget balance-to-GDP ratio. If the life-cycle hypothesis of savings is valid, 
consumption smoothing through the lifetime would indicate that people move from 
net borrowers in their youth to net savers in their working years and finally to dis-
 
5In the standard case when agents from different generations are treated equally regardless of the size of each 
generation to which one belongs, the real interest rate is independent of the population growth rate and increases 
with the rate of technology change and the rate of time preference; under the alternative assumption that the utility 
of each generation is weighted equally irrespective of its size (i.e., agents from different generations are treated 
differently), population growth will bring about a one-to-one increase in the real interest rate. See the textbook 
treatment in Romer (2012) for a more in-depth discussion of this point. 
6 For a recent reference pertaining to the relationship between demographic changes and economic 
development, see World Bank Group (2016). 
7They decomposed real GDP growth into four components (labor productivity, employment rate, changes in 
the population age structure, and population growth) and found that, from the 2010s, the contribution of the 
population to Korea’s GDP growth has fallen to 0.4%p and the change in the age structure has become a negative 
component. 
8Börsch-Supan, Härtl and Ludwig (2014)—based on an overlapping generations model with behavioral 
reactions—also show that while the negative growth effect from population aging in Europe can be compensated 
for by reforms and economic adaptation mechanisms, they may be offset by behavioral reactions. 
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savers in their elderly years. The demographic impact on investment appears to be 
less clear, but a potential impact exists through savings and labor supply channels. 
Given the evolution of savings and investment patterns in tandem with 
demographic changes, current account balances would improve with a larger 
working age population but worsen with the increase in the elderly share. On the 
fiscal side, a higher share of the working-age population will induce greater 
revenue, while an aging population will result in greater spending in such areas as 
pensions and health and long-term care spending, aggravating the fiscal balance. 
Existing studies, those by including Callen et al. (2004) and the External Balance 
Assessment (EBA) methodology by Phillips et al. (2013) at the IMF, broadly 
confirm these hypotheses, though there are variations in their effects across studies.  
There has been rather limited research on inflation in the context of population 
dynamics. Population aging could affect inflation via both demand and supply 
channels. On the demand side, a rising share of the elderly with lower incomes and 
a negative wealth effect from falling asset prices will restrict the aggregate 
consumption, whereas a greater propensity to consume by the elderly could 
increase aggregate consumption. Aging could affect inflation in either direction as 
well from the supply side; this factor could decrease the labor supply and increase 
average wages, which would push up inflation. Aging could also increase labor 
participation by the elderly or the female population, who usually work in low-
wage areas, hence exerting downward pressure on inflation. The net inflationary 
impact will depend on the extent of the supply-side adjustment in response to 
changes in aggregate demand. Therefore, the overall effect on inflation must be 
discussed in the context of a particular model from a theoretical perspective.9 
Empirical evidence of inflation has been scant and inconclusive and there are 
intrinsic difficulties when attempting to identify the empirical impact on asset 
prices as well. A full-blown DSGE model that is used by the IMF for policy 
purposes has been modified to incorporate demographic changes—albeit in an hoc 
manner—by Anderson, Botman, and Hunt (2014) and used to understand whether 
Japan’s population aging is deflationary or not. They found that substantial 
deflationary pressures arise from population aging—mainly through declining 
growth and falling land prices—and their findings are based on simulations of a 
calibrated model rather than being empirically motivated and validated. 
Japan is one of a number of countries which have been studied quite extensively 
in the context of demographic changes. Not only has the country gone through 
drastic economic changes in terms of growth, but its transition from an aging 
society to an aged society has been the most rapid in world history. Three European 
countries—France, Germany, and England—underwent a transformation from an 
aging society to an aged society in 115, 45, and 45 years, respectively; it took 65 
years for the United States to undergo this transformation. In contrast, the change 
took only 24 years in Japan. Muto et al. (2012) investigates how demographic 
changes affect GNP per capita and other real variables—mainly via changes on the 
supply side. In contrast, Katagiri (2012) captures the effects via the demand 
 
9Focusing on the interaction among different population groups and the desire for a redistribution of resources 
in the economy, Bullard et al. (2012) asserts that a baby boom can generate temporarily higher inflation and that 
aging population dynamics will put downward pressure on inflation or even lead to deflation as the elderly—
preferring a higher real rate of return from their savings—have more influence over the redistributive policy. 
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channels by calibrating preference shocks that correspond to the Japanese 
experience of changes in demand structures and finds using a multi-sector new 
Keynesian model that population aging—modeled as unexpected shocks to its 
demand structure—caused deflationary pressure of about 0.3%p. The effect of 
demographic changes on the real interest rate has been studied in an infinite-
horizon setting by Ikeda and Saito (2012).  
Considerable difficulty lies in choosing appropriate variables for capturing 
demographic changes. In a representative-agent model of growth, population 
growth is a clean exogenous component that is to be used for empirical analysis. 
However, in a model with heterogeneous agents—typically in the setting of 
overlapping generations—there are compositional changes in demographics. Callen 
et al. (2004) uses the share of the working-age population and the share of the 
elderly population as two independent variables; other papers, including Muto et 
al. (2012), capture the growth and composition of the population via the fertility 
rate and the longevity rate. While changes in fertility or mortality are key drivers of 
demographic changes, they may not be adequate indicators when analyzing the 
macroeconomic impact of demographic changes considering the long lag with 
which these changes affect the population structure and therefore the economy. For 
this reason, demographic indicators reflecting the age structure, such as the share of 
the working-age population or dependency ratios, have often been employed to 
examine their impact on the macroeconomy. In this paper, we follow this approach 
and use the shares of the working-age population and the elderly population as 
appropriate variables for capturing population dynamics, while utilizing the 
dependency ratios in regressions that involve savings, investment, and the current 
account balance.10 
 
IV. Empirical Findings 
 
A. Data and Methodology 
 
A panel dataset covering 30 OECD economies for the period of 1960–2013 is 
constructed to examine the relationship between demographic variables and 
macroeconomic variables. Specifically, the analysis focuses on the impact of 
demographic changes on each of the following measures of macroeconomic 
performance: the growth of the real GDP per capita, the current account 
balance/GDP, savings/GDP, investment/GDP, government budget balance/GDP, 
and the inflation rate. Building on the bivariate relationships as illustrated in Figure 
A2, A3, and A4, we proceed with a multivariate analysis controlling for other 
explanatory factors. 
In order to examine the impact of demography as a determinant of economic 
performance, we begin with following specification: 
 
10There are alternative ways to split population differently. For example, Fair and Dominguez (1991) 
classified the entire population into five-year buckets and estimated U.S. consumption as a function of more than 
one dozen buckets. 
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    it i it it itY Demo         
 
where Y is the macroeconomic variable of interest and Demo are relevant measures 
of the demographic structures of individual countries. Z is a set of control variables 
and the subscripts i and t denote the country and the time period, respectively. Our 
base estimation scheme is a fixed-effects estimation in the case of cross-country 
panel data and OLS in the case of a single-country analysis using annual data.  
All demography variables, including population growth, the shares of specific 
age groups, life expectancy, and other derivative measures such as dependency 
ratios are taken from or calculated based on the population database of the United 
Nations. An additional benefit of the UN database is that it provides demographic 
structure projections for most individual countries in the world. In this paper, 
World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, available in United Nations 
(2014), is used to gain information about the future paths of demographic 
measures. 
Control variables for the growth regression include the secondary school 
enrollment ratio, investment/GDP, budget balance/GDP, the inflation rate, and 
degree of openness. For the three regressions of the current account, savings, and 
investment, the controls are budget balance/GDP, net foreign assets/GDP, growth in 
the terms of trade, real GDP growth, and openness. Budget balance regression has 
terms-of-trade growth and openness as control variables. Finally, controls for 
inflation regression are the terms of trade growth, real GDP growth, M2 growth, 
and the changes in budget balance/GDP. 
Most macro variables of interest, as well as control variables, are constructed 
using World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics databases of 
the IMF or the World Development Indicator database of the World Bank. 
Additionally, the PPP-based real GDP per capita variable is from the Penn World 
Table (PWT) version 7.1 by Heston et al. (2012), and the net foreign asset variable 
is from the updated version of the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) dataset. Table 
A1 and A2 provides summary statistics for the key variables used in the analysis 
and the list of sample countries. Table A3 presents further details on the variables 
used to analyze the impacts of demographic variables, including their respective 
sources. 
 
B. Macroeconomic Impact 
 
1. Growth Impact 
 
We now turn to the effects of the demographic changes on the macroeconomic 
variables. Because the next subsection will focus on the effects on inflation, the 
three tables in this subsection focus on the real side of the macroeconomic 
variables. The first table displays the demographic impact on real GDP growth per 
capita, and Table 2 will provide information about the impact on the current 
account, savings, and investment. Table 3 will then focus on the fiscal policy 
variables of the budget balance, revenue, and expenditures. 
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TABLE 1—DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT ON GROWTH OF REAL GDP PER CAPITA (PPP-BASED) 
 OECD FE  OECD FE IV 2/  Japan OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Population 
Growth 
-0.686 
[0.270]  
-1.194 
[0.018]** 
-1.130 
[0.031]**  
0.075 
[0.807]  
-0.621 
[0.053]* 
-0.504 
[0.118]  
0.940 
[0.791]  
-0.259 
[0.935] 
2.589 
[0.717] 
Share of 65 and 
over  
-0.211 
[0.002]*** 
-0.261 
[0.000]*** 
-0.122 
[0.349]   
-0.590 
[0.000]*** 
-0.614 
[0.000]*** 
-0.365 
[0.000]***   
-0.602 
[0.120] 
-0.610 
[0.088]* 
-0.782 
[0.118] 
Share of 15-64  -0.132 [0.159] 
-0.201 
[0.037]** 
-0.090 
[0.372]   
-0.159 
[0.009]*** 
-0.192 
[0.002]*** 
0.010 
[0.901]   
-1.973 
[0.027]** 
-1.984 
[0.037]** 
-2.079 
[0.032]** 
Life Expectancy    -0.198 [0.189]     
-0.363 
[0.000]***     
0.756 
[0.672] 
Openness 0.008 [0.276] 
0.013 
[0.188] 
0.019 
[0.041]** 
0.025 
[0.006]*** 
0.007 
[0.331] 
0.018 
[0.011]** 
0.022 
[0.004]*** 
0.033 
[0.000]***  
0.118 
[0.326] 
-0.083 
[0.593] 
-0.087 
[0.634] 
-0.108 
[0.595] 
Secondary School 
Enrollment 
-0.018 
[0.116] 
0.005 
[0.571] 
0.006 
[0.485] 
0.014 
[0.132]  
-0.040 
[0.000]*** 
-0.002 
[0.862] 
-0.002 
[0.882] 
0.015 
[0.185]  
-0.297 
[0.434] 
0.269 
[0.427] 
0.257 
[0.539] 
0.200 
[0.665] 
Budget 
Balance/GDP 
0.091 
[0.100] 
0.083 
[0.135] 
0.100 
[0.081]* 
0.100 
[0.070]*  
-0.003 
[0.956] 
0.028 
[0.549] 
0.044 
[0.347] 
0.053 
[0.258]  
0.110 
[0.545] 
0.450 
[0.085]* 
0.451 
[0.084]* 
0.425 
[0.132] 
Inflation -0.090 [0.000]*** 
-0.101 
[0.000]*** 
-0.103 
[0.000]*** 
-0.100 
[0.000]***  
-0.087 
[0.000]*** 
-0.112 
[0.000]*** 
-0.113 
[0.000]*** 
-0.105 
[0.000]***  
-0.555 
[0.010]*** 
-0.649 
[0.000]*** 
-0.639 
[0.000]*** 
-0.639 
[0.000]*** 
Investment/GDP 0.272 [0.000]*** 
0.244 
[0.000]*** 
0.248 
[0.000]*** 
0.244 
[0.000]***  
-0.105 
[0.014]** 
-0.179 
[0.000]*** 
-0.178 
[0.000]*** 
-0.188 
[0.000]***  
0.380 
[0.256] 
0.623 
[0.049]** 
0.618 
[0.043]** 
0.664 
[0.030]** 
Constant -1.670 [0.309] 
7.407 
[0.208] 
12.862 
[0.035]** 
17.557 
[0.041]**  
8.548 
[0.000]*** 
24.193 
[0.000]*** 
26.897 
[0.000]*** 
35.604 
[0.000]***  
19.075 
[0.692] 
106.059 
[0.038]** 
108.522 
[0.124] 
60.834 
[0.628] 
Observations 1,104 1,104 1,104 1,104  1,072 1,072 1,072 1,072  40 40 40 40 
Number of 
ifscode 30 30 30 30  30 30 30 30      
R-squared 0.177 0.185 0.199 0.203       0.444 0.513 0.513 0.516 
Note: 1) Fixed-effect estimation for OECD and OLS for individual country regressions using annual data. 2) Secondary school enrollment, Budget balance/GDP, Inflation, and 
Investment/GDP are instrumented using their lagged values. 3) P-values based on robust t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 1 shows the results of how demographic variables—together with other 
key explanatory variables—affect the growth in real GDP per capita (PPP-based) in 
OECD countries. The first column includes only the growth rate of the population 
as a demographic variable. Population growth affects real growth negatively, 
though insignificantly. Among the other variables, the coefficient of inflation is 
negative and significant at the 1 percent level, and the impact of investment to the 
GDP ratio on real GDP growth per capita is significantly positive. The next column 
is based on a regression that uses the share of the elderly (65 and above) and the 
share of those aged 15-64 instead of population growth. Between the two variables, 
the share of the elderly affects output growth negatively and significantly, while the 
influence of the share of those aged 15-64 is insignificantly negative. Inflation and 
the investment-to-GDP ratio affect GDP growth in ways similar to those shown in 
Column (1). Column (3) includes the three population variables together; it is 
interesting that all three variables—population growth, the share of the elderly, and 
the share of those aged 15-64—turn out to be significant while openness becomes 
significant at the 5 percent confidence level. The fourth column has life expectancy 
as well as the three population variables, as life expectancy affects the population 
dynamics differently; in this case, only the impact of population growth is 
significant at the 5 percent level. The message of the four specifications is that the 
size of the population affects real GDP per capita growth negatively and that aging, 
as captured by the share of those aged 65 and above, influences real GDP growth in 
a negative way. The next four columns—Columns (5) to (8)—are based on the 
instrumental variables method to address a potential endogeneity problem, and the 
message is similar. Life expectancy affects real GDP growth significantly and 
negatively in this case. 
Table 1 also includes the results for Japan. Though it is generally regarded that 
changes in population dynamics have been most dramatic in this country, the 
results of the demographic impact on growth are not as strong.11 For example, the 
share of those aged 15-64 affects GDP growth per capita negatively, most likely 
due to endogeneity, which is not fully captured in this specification. It is interesting 
that the coefficient for inflation is significantly negative in all four specifications. 
 
2. Impact on Current Account, Savings, and Investment 
 
We now turn to the demographic impact on three key macroeconomic variables: 
current account, savings, and investment—all relative to GDP. It is interesting to 
note with regard to their bivariate relationships, as presented in Appendices 4 and 
5, that a rising elderly share improves the current account mainly through a 
reduction in investment, while a greater working-age share improves the current 
account, but due to a greater increase in savings than in investment. Turning to the 
results of the multivariate analysis, the top part of Table 2 is based on the 
population variables that were used in Table 1, while the bottom part is based on 
 
11The impact on aggregate real GDP growth could be sizable, considering the effect of the declining and 
aging population on labor inputs. The demographic impact on per capita growth would be less so, as it will depend 
on how demographic changes affect the combination of factor inputs and the level of productivity. 
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two newly defined variables regarding the composition of the population. The 
results based on the regressions for the OECD countries using the share of those 
aged 65 and above and the share of those aged 15-64, as well as population growth 
and life expectancy, are displayed in Columns (1) to (3). Population growth 
influences current account, savings, and investment negatively, though 
insignificantly. The negative impact of the elderly share is significant for savings 
and investment. Life expectancy affects savings positively and significantly, which 
reflects the growing need for the elderly to spread their consumption over their 
longer living years.12 
The columns on the right are based on the data of Japan. Columns (5) and (6) 
show that population growth and life expectancy influence savings and investment 
negatively and that the negative impacts are significant at the 1 percent confidence 
level.  
The lower half of Table 2 is based on the old dependency and young dependency 
ratios, which are a transformation of the population shares, as noted below the 
table. As in the other case displayed in the upper half, the old dependency ratio 
influences savings and investment negatively for OECD countries, as in Columns 
(8) and (9); population growth and life expectancy affect savings and investment 
negatively for Japan, as in Columns (11) and (12). 
 
3. Fiscal Impact 
 
Table 3 focuses on the variables that are closely related to fiscal policy: budget 
balance, government revenue, and government expenditure—all relative to GDP. 
For OECD countries, population growth affects the budget balance positively. The 
elderly share is shown to affect the budget balance negatively, as its effect on 
expenditure appears to be greater than that on revenue. Other variables do not 
affect the budget balance significantly. Revenue is negatively affected by 
population growth, while the impact by the population shares, on the other hand, is 
positive. Expenditure variables are affected similarly, with openness affecting them 
negatively. 
In the case of Japan, the bottom panel, which shows the influence of population 
growth on the budget balance, is mixed. The share variables are quite significant in 
their impact on these fiscal policy variables, particularly when including the 
positive and significant coefficient of the elderly share on expenditure. 
  
 
12This demographic impact on the current account needs to be considered when assessing the desirable level 
of the current account positions, including those in the IMF’s External Balance Assessment exercise. 
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TABLE 2—DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT ON CURRENT ACCOUNT, SAVINGS, AND INVESTMENT 
 
OECD  Japan 
CA/GDP 
(1) 
S/GDP 
(2) 
I/GDP 
(3) 
 CA/GDP 
(4) 
S/GDP 
(5) 
I/GDP 
(6) 
Population 
Growth 
-0.397 
[0.603] 
-0.776 
[0.277] 
-0.185 
[0.836]  
2.050 
[0.305] 
-7.740 
[0.000]*** 
-10.113 
[0.002]*** 
Share of 65 
and over 
-0.372 
[0.141] 
-0.942 
[0.001]*** 
-0.486 
[0.043]**  
-0.464 
[0.199] 
0.270 
[0.217] 
0.604 
[0.239] 
Share of 15-64 -0.246 [0.163] 
0.012 
[0.951] 
0.249 
[0.219]  
0.358 
[0.339] 
0.582 
[0.085]* 
0.122 
[0.836] 
Life 
Expectancy 
0.379 
[0.180] 
0.428 
[0.019]** 
-0.210 
[0.327]  
0.826 
[0.085]* 
-2.222 
[0.000]*** 
-2.942 
[0.000]*** 
Budget 
Balance/GDP 
0.109 
[0.215] 
0.399 
[0.000]*** 
0.313 
[0.000]***  
0.089 
[0.311] 
0.516 
[0.000]*** 
0.445 
[0.013]** 
NFA/GDP 0.026 [0.009]*** 
0.028 
[0.000]*** 
0.002 
[0.652]  
0.111 
[0.059]* 
0.018 
[0.681] 
-0.088 
[0.296] 
TOT change 0.110 [0.001]*** 
0.063 
[0.001]*** 
-0.049 
[0.043]**  
0.079 
[0.000]*** 
0.010 
[0.564] 
-0.072 
[0.017]** 
GDP Growth -0.106 [0.195] 
0.180 
[0.027]** 
0.255 
[0.000]***  
0.109 
[0.043]** 
0.066 
[0.294] 
-0.047 
[0.564] 
Openness 0.033 [0.105] 
0.005 
[0.754] 
-0.024 
[0.209]  
0.078 
[0.317] 
0.004 
[0.948] 
-0.084 
[0.462] 
Constant -9.447 [0.484] 
2.229 
[0.824] 
31.270 
[0.006]***  
-85.597 
[0.022]** 
167.525 
[0.000]*** 
254.051 
[0.000]*** 
Observations 1,163 1,121 1,163 43 43 43 
Number of 
ifscode 30 29 30    
R-squared 0.184 0.439 0.383 0.770 0.973 0.953 
RMSE 3.157 2.889 2.834 0.763 0.741 1.170 
 
OECD  Japan 
CA/GDP 
(7) 
S/GDP 
(8) 
I/GDP 
(9) 
 CA/GDP 
(10) 
S/GDP 
(11) 
I/GDP 
(12) 
Population 
Growth 
-0.654 
[0.380] 
-0.876 
[0.258] 
-0.021 
[0.981]  
1.681 
[0.376] 
-8.125 
[0.000]*** 
-10.213 
[0.001]*** 
Old 
Dependency 
-0.162 
[0.215] 
-0.560 
[0.000]*** 
-0.332 
[0.006]***  
-0.423 
[0.026]** 
-0.036 
[0.813] 
0.372 
[0.172] 
Young 
Dependency 
0.143 
[0.080]* 
0.019 
[0.829] 
-0.121 
[0.173]  
-0.110 
[0.547] 
-0.291 
[0.064]* 
-0.117 
[0.680] 
Life 
Expectancy 
0.448 
[0.133] 
0.368 
[0.038]** 
-0.339 
[0.148]  
0.755 
[0.087]* 
-2.341 
[0.000]*** 
-3.013 
[0.000]*** 
Budget 
Balance/GDP 
0.115 
[0.184] 
0.398 
[0.000]*** 
0.306 
[0.000]***  
0.088 
[0.302] 
0.525 
[0.000]*** 
0.459 
[0.008]*** 
NFA/GDP 0.026 [0.009]*** 
0.029 
[0.000]*** 
0.002 
[0.566]  
0.117 
[0.032]** 
-0.002 
[0.967] 
-0.117 
[0.141] 
TOT change 0.108 [0.001]*** 
0.063 
[0.001]*** 
-0.048 
[0.044]**  
0.079 
[0.000]*** 
0.012 
[0.466] 
-0.070 
[0.015]** 
GDP Growth -0.109 [0.185] 
0.180 
[0.025]** 
0.259 
[0.000]***  
0.112 
[0.037]** 
0.068 
[0.274] 
-0.048 
[0.544] 
Openness 0.033 [0.109] 
0.004 
[0.811] 
-0.025 
[0.208]  
0.079 
[0.302] 
0.000 
[0.993] 
-0.090 
[0.417] 
Constant -36.980 [0.097]* 
5.890 
[0.672] 
61.560 
[0.002]***  
-50.522 
[0.170] 
229.472 
[0.000]*** 
272.624 
[0.000]*** 
Observations 1,163 1,121 1,163 43 43 43 
Number of 
ifscode 30 29 30    
R-squared 0.188 0.431 0.379 0.780 0.973 0.955 
RMSE 3.149 2.909 2.844 0.745 0.739 1.141 
Note: 1) Fixed-effect estimation for OECD and OLS for individual country regressions using annual data. 2) 
Young Dependency= (Ages 0-14) / (Ages 15-64); Old Dependency= (Ages 65 and over) / (Ages 15-64). 3) P-
values based on robust t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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TABLE 3—DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT ON BUDGET BALANCE, REVENUE, AND EXPENDITURE PER GDP 
OECD Balance  Revenue  Expenditure (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Population 
Growth 
1.771 
[0.009]***  
1.472 
[0.034]** 
1.489 
[0.030]**  
-3.533 
[0.001]***  
-1.489 
[0.126] 
-1.703 
[0.052]*  
-5.151 
[0.000]***  
-3.017 
[0.023]** 
-3.282 
[0.008]*** 
Share of 
65 and over  
-0.288 
[0.024]** 
-0.214 
[0.126] 
-0.051 
[0.779]   
0.900 
[0.000]*** 
0.825 
[0.000]*** 
0.204 
[0.469]   
1.102 
[0.000]*** 
0.952 
[0.000]*** 
0.182 
[0.571] 
Share of 
15-64  
-0.046 
[0.722] 
0.035 
[0.792] 
0.158 
[0.340]   
0.373 
[0.005]*** 
0.310 
[0.039]** 
-0.108 
[0.642]   
0.366 
[0.060]* 
0.239 
[0.277] 
-0.279 
[0.362] 
Life 
Expectancy    
-0.184 
[0.319]     
0.685 
[0.015]**     
0.849 
[0.010]** 
TOT Change 0.011 [0.604] 
0.015 
[0.474] 
0.012 
[0.550] 
0.012 
[0.560]  
0.039 
[0.015]** 
0.029 
[0.066]* 
0.032 
[0.051]* 
0.024 
[0.139]  
0.001 
[0.961] 
-0.012 
[0.552] 
-0.005 
[0.795] 
-0.015 
[0.483] 
Openness -0.021 [0.028]** 
-0.006 
[0.508] 
-0.012 
[0.257] 
-0.006 
[0.603]  
-0.007 
[0.806] 
-0.075 
[0.008]*** 
-0.068 
[0.011]** 
-0.089 
[0.001]***  
0.001 
[0.981] 
-0.077 
[0.008]*** 
-0.063 
[0.024]** 
-0.089 
[0.002]*** 
Constant -2.417 [0.001]*** 
4.487 
[0.568] 
-2.385 
[0.772] 
0.929 
[0.920]  
33.001 
[0.000]*** 
-0.789 
[0.923] 
4.821 
[0.641] 
-9.84 
[0.292]  
36.304 
[0.000]*** 
-0.105 
[0.993] 
11.259 
[0.432] 
-6.917 
[0.610] 
Observations 1,338 1,338 1,338 1,338  1,193 1,193 1,193 1,193  1,193 1,193 1,193 1,193 
Number of 
ifscode 30 30 30 30  30 30 30 30  30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.057 0.051 0.071 0.076  0.113 0.299 0.315 0.362  0.130 0.230 0.267 0.308 
RMSE 3.202 3.214 3.182 3.173  3.399 3.021 2.988 2.885  4.489 4.226 4.124 4.011 
Note: 1) Fixed-effect estimation for OECD and OLS for individual country regressions using annual data. 2) P-values based on robust t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 3—DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT ON BUDGET BALANCE, REVENUE, AND EXPENDITURE PER GDP (CONTINUED) 
Japan Balance  Revenue  Expenditure (13) (14) (15) (16)  (17) (18) (19) (20)  (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Population 
Growth 
1.979 
[0.001]***  
1.857 
[0.128] 
-5.381 
[0.050]**  
-8.902 
[0.000]***  
-1.072 
[0.358] 
-3.558 
[0.057]*  
-10.881 
[0.000]***  
-2.929 
[0.042]** 
1.822 
[0.307] 
Share of 
65 and over  
-0.165 
[0.012]** 
-0.006 
[0.965] 
0.892 
[0.000]***   
0.939 
[0.000]*** 
0.847 
[0.000]*** 
1.156 
[0.000]***   
1.104 
[0.000]*** 
0.853 
[0.000]*** 
0.264 
[0.192] 
Share of 
15-64  
0.235 
[0.208] 
0.276 
[0.201] 
2.117 
[0.000]***   
0.809 
[0.000]*** 
0.785 
[0.000]*** 
1.418 
[0.000]***   
0.574 
[0.000]*** 
0.510 
[0.000]*** 
-0.699 
[0.037]** 
Life 
Expectancy    
-1.931 
[0.000]***     
-0.663 
[0.029]**     
1.267 
[0.000]*** 
TOT Change -0.058 [0.203] 
-0.056 
[0.220] 
-0.054 
[0.219] 
0.016 
[0.616]  
-0.039 
[0.482] 
-0.048 
[0.043]** 
-0.049 
[0.056]* 
-0.025 
[0.293]  
0.019 
[0.734] 
0.008 
[0.849] 
0.005 
[0.898] 
-0.041 
[0.295] 
Openness -0.250 [0.004]*** 
-0.163 
[0.095]* 
-0.192 
[0.060]* 
0.289 
[0.075]*  
-0.033 
[0.638] 
-0.167 
[0.004]*** 
-0.151 
[0.004]*** 
0.015 
[0.879]  
0.216 
[0.012]** 
-0.004 
[0.956] 
0.042 
[0.594] 
-0.275 
[0.016]** 
Constant 0.514 [0.774] 
-14.021 
[0.310] 
-19.244 
[0.239] 
-12.109 
[0.309]  
21.026 
[0.000]*** 
-47.738 
[0.001]*** 
-44.724 
[0.001]*** 
-42.273 
[0.001]***  
20.511 
[0.000]*** 
-33.717 
[0.000]*** 
-25.48 
[0.002]*** 
-30.164 
[0.000]*** 
Observations 54 54 54 54  54 54 54 54  54 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.412 0.419 0.431 0.649  0.740 0.886 0.888 0.898  0.839 0.904 0.912 0.934 
RMSE 2.400 2.410 2.408 1.913  2.486 1.665 1.669 1.606  2.576 2.004 1.944 1.699 
Note: 1) Fixed-effect estimation for OECD and OLS for individual country regressions using annual data. 2) P-values based on robust t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SID
ab
cd
ef_
:M
S_
00
01
MS
_0
00
1
18 KDI Journal of Economic Policy FEBRUARY 2018 
C. Inflation Impact 
 
As mentioned above, the demographic impact on real variables—summarized in 
Tables 1 to 3—has also been analyzed in previous studies. What has received much 
less attention is the demographic impact on inflation, which is ambiguous in theory 
given various conflicting channels. For example, population aging or shrinking will 
have multifarious demand-side effects due to changing consumption preferences, 
possibly leading to a reduction in aggregate demand in the economy and lower 
inflation. On the other hand, it would reduce the effective supply of labor in the 
economy, adding inflation pressures. As noted earlier, the demographic impact 
would depend on how changes in the population size and structure affect aggregate 
demand and supply, agents’ inflation expectations, and asset prices, which in turn 
depend on the extent of nominal and real friction, institutional aspects, and 
behavioral responses. 
Hence, it is difficult to determine from a theoretical perspective how various 
changes in demographics affect inflation, and it would ultimately be an empirical 
issue, to which Table 4 is devoted.13 This table is based on regressing inflation on 
demographic variables, as well as other relevant conditioning variables; the 
columns on the left display results for the OECD data and those on the right 
correspond to the Japanese case. To capture the deviation from the anticipated 
change in inflation and population changes, the two variables are detrended using a 
quadratic trend given that there is a slow-moving component in these series.14 
As displayed in Column (1), population growth affects inflation positively, as a 
greater population implies more aggregate demand. This may be due to the fact that 
the aggregate supply adjustment could be slower than the aggregate demand 
adjustment in response to demographic shocks in the short or medium term.15 
When the share of the elderly is added as an independent variable (Column 2), 
population growth continues to affect inflation positively and the influence of the 
elderly share is significantly negative. Conditional on population growth, the aging 
process will suppress inflation significantly. This is true when the share of those 
aged 15-64 is coupled with the elderly share (Columns 3 and 4) and when life 
expectancy is added as well (Column 5). Other conditioning variables used are the 
changes in terms of trade, GDP growth, M2 growth, and the change in the budget 
balance, all of which show very significant coefficients with the expected signs.16
 
13We attempted to estimate the impact of population growth and aging on housing prices, but were not 
produce to draw meaningful empirical evidence. This may be partly due to the intrinsic difficulties in estimating 
asset prices. See Terrones (2004), however, for an empirical analysis regarding this issue. Dent (2014) focuses on 
the influence of demographic changes on asset prices as well as aggregate consumption based on the size of the 
population cohort with the highest consumption capacity. 
14Detrending would also avoid the possibility of a spurious regression due to non-stationary trend elements. 
The detrended time series can be interpreted as an unanticipated shock from the trend. 
15If supply responses are as flexible as demand responses, there could be little impact on inflation. However, 
there may be other channels through which demographic shocks could impart deflationary pressures on the 
economy, including its impact through the wealth effect, due to changing asset prices and/or real exchange rate 
appreciation arising from changes in asset allocations. 
16It would be desirable if the coefficients for the share of those aged 15-64 to be positive, which is not true in 
Table 4. However, if the share of the elderly and the share of those aged 15-64 could be replaced with the 
population sizes of the two groups, the two coefficients are estimated to have the desirable signs, though the 
outcomes would not be statistically significant. See the Table A4. 
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TABLE 4—DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT ON INFLATION 
 OECD  Japan 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Population 
Growth 
0.339 
[0.715] 
0.524 
[0.577]  
0.549 
[0.570] 
0.317 
[0.764] 
6.689 
[0.005]*** 
6.363 
[0.003]***  
6.708 
[0.001]*** 
6.725 
[0.001]*** 
Share of 65 
and over  
-0.176 
[0.009]*** 
-0.125 
[0.013]** 
-0.137 
[0.006]*** 
-0.416 
[0.008]***  
-0.101 
[0.394] 
-0.321 
[0.082]* 
-0.300 
[0.060]* 
-0.242 
[0.227] 
Share of 
15-64   
-0.101 
[0.226] 
-0.103 
[0.233] 
-0.330 
[0.037]**   
-0.476 
[0.030]** 
-0.544 
[0.008]*** 
-0.499 
[0.026]** 
Life 
Expectancy     
0.304 
[0.043]**     
-0.092 
[0.748] 
TOT Change -0.145 [0.005]*** 
-0.144 
[0.005]*** 
-0.145 
[0.005]*** 
-0.144 
[0.005]*** 
-0.143 
[0.005]*** 
-0.169 
[0.016]** 
-0.174 
[0.014]** 
-0.178 
[0.013]** 
-0.148 
[0.016]** 
-0.147 
[0.016]** 
GDP Growth -0.750 [0.000]*** 
-0.795 
[0.000]*** 
-0.799 
[0.000]*** 
-0.802 
[0.000]*** 
-0.784 
[0.000]*** 
-0.246 
[0.015]** 
-0.319 
[0.033]** 
-0.517 
[0.008]*** 
-0.431 
[0.008]*** 
-0.452 
[0.022]** 
M2 Growth 0.192 [0.000]*** 
0.183. 
[0.000]*** 
0.180 
[0.001]*** 
0.180 
[0.001]*** 
0.176 
[0.000]*** 
0.059 
[0.118] 
0.034 
[0.379] 
0.007 
[0.869] 
-0.009 
[0.826] 
-0.015 
[0.751] 
Budget 
Balance Chg. 
0.129 
[0.051]* 
0.153 
[0.022]** 
0.153 
[0.033]** 
0.158 
[0.018]** 
0.150 
[0.022]** 
-0.105 
[0.540] 
-0.086 
[0.563] 
0.006 
[0.971] 
0.040 
[0.776] 
0.059 
[0.690] 
Constant -0.053 [0.910] 
2.418 
[0.060]* 
8.443 
[0.149] 
8.739 
[0.151] 
4.132 
[0.255] 
0.074 
[0.821] 
1.870 
[0.399] 
37.962 
[0.031]** 
42.051 
[0.010]** 
45.446 
[0.038]** 
Observations 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167  53 53 53 53 53 
Number of 
ifscode 30 30 30 30 30       
R-squared 0.212 0.216 0.217 0.217 0.222  0.530 0.545 0.462 0.602 0.603 
RMSE 5.235 5.227 5.223 5.223 5.209  2.077 2.066 2.246 1.954 1.973 
Note: 1) Inflation and population growth are detrended using quadratic filter. 2) Fixed-effect estimation for OECD and OLS for individual country regressions using annual data. 
3) P-values based on robust t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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The columns on the right hand side of Table 4 are generated from the data on 
Japan. Population growth influences the inflation rate significantly positively in all 
regressions. The effect from population shares is not as strong as it is in the OECD 
data.17 Terms of trade and GDP growth are significant in the Japanese data as well, 
while the insignificant result for the money growth variable is puzzling.18 
These results suggest that the ongoing demographic changes could have a 
significant deflationary impact in the years ahead, particularly on an economy 
experiencing a rapid decline and a significant aging of its population. Under such 
circumstances, the macroeconomic policy framework—including monetary and 
fiscal policies—must be revisited. This will be discussed in the concluding section. 
 
V. Conclusion: Policy Implications 
 
Demographic changes are among the most crucial long-term challenges that 
have a grave influence on the economy. Given the current fertility and mortality 
trends, the recent and coming decades will represent a watershed in demographic 
structures, in that we will observe a significant drop in population growth and the 
working-age population share and a rapid rise in the dependency ratio. Such 
demographic shifts have already accelerated in some countries, including Japan 
and Korea, and their impact on the economy may already be widespread, traversing 
economic growth, inflation, savings and investment, asset prices, and fiscal 
positions. 
Despite the expected grave consequences on the economy, in many 
macroeconomic policy discussions or debates, demographic changes do not usually 
take center stage. For example, most growth models assume that a population 
grows at a constant rate—sometimes zero for simplicity—and many business cycle 
models fix the size of the population when analyzing aggregate demand. We have 
analyzed how demographic variables move over time and how these variables 
influence inflation as well as real macroeconomic variables.  
By using a regression analysis, this paper found that population growth affects 
real economic variables in a negative manner, though the outcomes were 
insignificant in many instances. The influence of population dynamics on fiscal 
policy variables is rather mixed. On the inflation side, population growth affects 
the inflation rate positively, most likely through its influence on lower aggregate 
demand and the slow supply responses for which specific channels have yet to be 
examined. In this vein, the ongoing demographic changes—both shrinking and 
aging—could have a sizable deflationary impact in the coming years. These 
dynamics involving demographic changes would change the framework of 
 
17The significance of population growth with regard to inflation regression on Japan, which is in stark 
contrast to that in the other OECD countries, may be due to the rapidly declining population. In addition to 
reducing aggregate demand, the declining population may have led to falling housing prices, which lowers 
aggregate demand even further. 
18Money growth with a lag could be included in the regression to alleviate the endogeneity problem. 
However, the inclusion of lagged variables did not change the result significantly. It is possible to use short-term 
nominal interest rates instead of money growth, but is also well known that short-term rates respond to various 
macroeconomic variables, notably inflation and the output gap. 
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macroeconomic policies.  
Taking the discussion of monetary policy as an example, one of the most popular 
ways to conduct and/or analyze monetary policy is via a reaction function that 
relates the policy short-term rate to a few variables that capture the state of the 
economy. The most well known is the rule set forth by John Taylor, under which 
the setting of short-term interest rates responds to inflation and the output gap as 
well as the equilibrium real interest rate. Population dynamics could affect the 
independent variables in this reaction function. 
First, the equilibrium real interest rate can depend on both the growth rate of the 
population and the age composition of the population. It is, furthermore, 
challenging to nail down this relationship. The dependence on population growth is 
related to how the society treats different generations when there is population 
growth. Regarding the population composition, different assumptions with 
reference to the demand structure in an aging society would yield different 
implications pertaining to the real interest rate.  
Second, the concept of the output gap depends on how the potential output is 
measured, which clearly depends on the population dynamics. Especially when the 
age structure changes over time, the potential output will depend critically on the 
assumptions regarding the labor participation rate and retirement age.19 Any 
disagreement on the potential output would cause different policy prescriptions 
with regard to the short-term policy rate. 
Last but not least, the direction of the policy rate depends on whether the actual 
inflation rate is above or below its target rate. In principle, the target rate can be set 
independently of any other variables in the economy if we follow the monetarist 
doctrine.20 However, when population dynamics affect other target variables—
such as the equilibrium real rate and the level of potential output—any 
misspecification in other parts of the economy would amount to unwanted inflation 
dynamics, and the inflation rate may not converge to its target as policymakers 
intend.21  If demographic changes bring significant deflationary pressures, an 
original inflation target will become unrealistic, and sticking to the target will 
require the central bank to continue inflating its balance sheet, which will soon 
become unsustainable. For this reason, the potential demographic impact on 
inflation must be taken into account properly in monetary policy decisions.22 
We have just taken monetary policy as an example of how understanding the 
impact of population dynamics could inform policymakers, but there are many 
other examples as well. The issue of how to implement fiscal policy is especially 
important when investigating the interaction with population dynamics. Fiscal 
policy tools are sometimes geared to specific groups and population dynamics 
 
19Measuring the potential output could become complicated since, as implied by the term 'demographic 
dividend', productivity may depend on demographic changes instead of moving exogenously. 
20That is, whether or not aging exerts downward pressure on prices may be irrelevant as a central bank 
committed to do whatever it takes should remain capable of anchoring inflation expectations at the target. 
Anderson, Botman, and Hunt (2014) attributed this monetarist doctrine to the lack of theoretical and empirical 
research on the relationship between demographics and inflation. 
21Rachel and Smith (2015) argued that global real interest rates have fallen by nearly 450 basis points over the 
past 30 years, referring to demographic forces as among the most important. 
22One possible approach is to consider the impact of demographic variables indirectly via a Taylor rule 
through other variables, such as the real interest rate, output gap or inflation expectations. 
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would affect fiscal policy directly, while monetary policy more or less affects 
economic agents without particular regard to individual population groups.23 
In this paper, we have examined how population dynamics influence various 
macroeconomic variables—including the inflation rate—from an empirical 
perspective. Our empirical results would help researchers form their ideas on how 
demographic changes could affect inflation or deflation and the macroeconomy. 
However, population dynamics and their interactions with macroeconomic 
variables are multifarious, with the macroeconomic impact being different 
depending on the particular stage of the demographic transition. For this reason, 
underlying theories about the relationships between demographics and 
macroeconomic variables and their link with the empirical results, including 
specific channels through which demographic changes affect inflation and the 
macroeconomy, were not suggested in this paper.  
To recap, it would be desirable, therefore, for further research, if the relationship 
could be analyzed from a theoretical perspective using a macroeconomic model. As 
alluded to in the preceding paragraphs, the interaction between population 
dynamics and variables involving macroeconomic policy need be incorporated into 
such a model based on a certain microeconomic foundation. Additional empirical 
study would also bring a better understanding of the channels through which 
demographic changes affect inflation and the macroeconomy and of the 
macroeconomic consequences. From a policy perspective, it remains crucial to 
implement appropriate policies without delay through a combination of sound 
monetary policy, fiscal consolidation, and bold structural reforms to mitigate the 
perverse effects of the ongoing drastic demographic changes. In addition to 
advanced countries which are already in the demographic watershed, developing 
countries facing the opposite demographic challenges with high fertility and 
younger populations should consider the potential impact when the demographic 
trends ultimately reverse and make intertemporally consistent policy choices. 
  
 
23See Park (2012) for an example. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1—SUMMARY OF KEY VARIABLES 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Population Growth 1,354 0.735 0.631 -0.482 3.172 
Population Growth (detrended) 1,354 -0.017 0.300 -1.194 1.103 
Share of 15-64 1,354 65.299 3.589 49.549 72.942 
Share of 65 and over 1,354 12.672 3.769 3.316 25.078 
Life Expectancy 1,354 74.992 4.804 47.575 83.580 
Old Dependency Ratio 1,354 19.285 5.511 5.956 40.532 
Young Dependency Ration 1,354 34.368 12.756 19.904 94.425 
      
Per Capita Growth 1,255 2.343 3.425 -14.613 12.748 
CA/GDP 1,329 -0.532 5.004 -28.383 21.266 
Savings/GDP 1,295 21.990 5.855 -4.245 40.445 
Investment/GDP 1,335 23.561 4.817 10.864 41.170 
Budget Balance/GDP 1,354 -2.485 4.222 -25.130 16.652 
Revenue/GDP 1,209 30.166 9.534 9.461 55.731 
Expenditure/GDP 1,209 32.835 10.112 9.714 58.459 
Inflation 1,342 7.323 11.369 -4.480 188.005 
Inflation (detrended) 1,342 0.179 7.569 -23.281 150.243 
 
TABLE A2—LIST OF SAMPLE OECD COUNTRIES 
United States Norway Spain 
United Kingdom Sweden Turkey 
Austria Switzerland Australia 
Belgium Canada New Zealand 
Denmark Japan Mexico 
France Finland Korea 
Germany Greece Czech Republic 
Italy Iceland Slovak Republic 
Luxembourg Ireland Hungary 
Netherlands Portugal Poland 
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TABLE A3—VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
Demography variables from UN population prospects (future projections based on the 2012 revision) 
Population Growth, detrended:  Population growth after quadratic detrending, where population growth 
is subtracted by a fitted value determined by regressing it on constant, trend, and trend squared. 
Share of the Working Age Population: Share of those aged between 15 and 64 years out of the total 
population. 
Share of the Elderly Population: Share of those aged over 64 out of the total population. 
Total Dependency Ratio: Number of persons in the population that are not of working age as a 
percentage of the working age population. 
Old Dependency Ratio: Number of persons in the population above the age of 64 as a percentage of the 
working age population. 
Young Dependency: Number of persons in the population below the age of 15 as a percentage of the 
working age population. 
Fertility Rate: Average number of child births per woman. 
Life Expectancy at Birth: Average number of years a person born can expect to live given the prevailing 
mortality rates in that area and period. 
Variables from World Economic Outlook (WEO) and/or World Development Indicator (WDI) databases 
Current Account/GDP, Savings/GDP, and Investment/GDP are from WEO and extended by WDI. 
Inflation rate is based on the CPI and is constructed from WDI and supplemented by WEO. 
Inflation rate, detrended: Inflation rate after quadratic detrending, where inflation rate is subtracted by a 
fitted value determined by regressing it on constant, trend, and trend squared. 
Openness: Sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by the nominal GDP. It is based on 
WDI and extended using WEO. 
Budget Balance/GDP: Central government budget balance divided by the nominal GDP. Government 
Revenue, Expenditure, and Balance divided by GDP are based on the WDI database and extended using 
WEO. 
Budget Balance Change: Change in the budget balance per GDP over the previous period. 
Secondary School Enrollment: Total is the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, 
expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age. This variable is from the 
WDI database. 
TOT Change: Log difference of goods-and-services terms of trade index from the previous period. Data 
are based on WEO values. 
GDP growth: Growth rate of the real GDP from the WDI database. 
Variables from Other Sources 
Per Capita GDP growth: Growth of real GDP per capita in PPP terms. The underlying PPP GDP variable 
is from the PENN World Table version 7.1. 
NFA/GDP: Net foreign assets divided by GDP is from the updated and extended version of the External 
Wealth of Nations dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
M2 Growth: Growth rate of money and quasi money. M2 data are from WDI and are extended using 
values from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. 
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FIGURE A1. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS OF CHINA 
Source: UN Population Prospects, 2012 revision. 
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FIGURE A2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MACRO VARIABLES AND THE ELDERLY SHARE 
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FIGURE A3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MACRO VARIABLES AND THE WORKING-AGE SHARE 
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FIGURE A4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MACRO VARIABLES AND POPULATION GROWTH 
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TABLE A4—DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT ON INFLATION (WITH THE SIZE OF THE POPULATION) 
 OECD  Japan 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Population 
Growth 
0.339 
[0.715] 
0.369 
[0.693]  
0.378 
[0.683] 
0.523 
[0.594] 
6.689 
[0.005]*** 
6.338 
[0.003]***  
6.467 
[0.001]*** 
6.272 
[0.003]*** 
Population 
65 and over  
-0.062 
[0.130] 
-0.103 
[0.036]** 
-0.107 
[0.033]** 
-0.087 
[0.122]  
-0.079 
[0.378] 
-0.113 
[0.252] 
-0.079 
[0.335] 
-0.281 
[0.224] 
Population 
15 to 64   
0.019 
[0.146] 
0.019 
[0.145] 
0.032 
[0.071]*   
-0.136 
[0.113] 
-0.147 
[0.076]* 
-0.320 
[0.084]* 
Life 
Expectancy     
-0.074 
[0.224]     
0.595 
[0.341] 
TOT Change -0.145 [0.005]*** 
-0.145 
[0.005]*** 
-0.145 
[0.005]*** 
-0.145 
[0.005]*** 
-0.145 
[0.005]*** 
-0.169 
[0.016]** 
-0.173 
[0.013]** 
-0.181 
[0.009]*** 
-0.154 
[0.012]** 
-0.153 
[0.014]** 
GDP Growth -0.750 [0.000]*** 
-0.765 
[0.000]*** 
-0.764 
[0.000]*** 
-0.765 
[0.000]*** 
-0.784 
[0.000]*** 
-0.246 
[0.015]** 
-0.326 
[0.034]** 
-0.564 
[0.015]** 
-0.476 
[0.019]** 
-0.470 
[0.020]** 
M2 Growth 0.192 [0.000]*** 
0.189 
[0.000]*** 
0.189 
[0.000]*** 
0.189 
[0.000]*** 
0.186 
[0.000]*** 
0.059 
[0.118] 
0.032 
[0.419] 
-0.003 
[0.952] 
-0.016 
[0.766] 
-0.014 
[0.781] 
Budget 
Balance Chg. 
0.129 
[0.051]* 
0.136 
[0.041]** 
0.133 
[0.055]* 
0.136 
[0.041]** 
0.147 
[0.025]** 
-0.105 
[0.540] 
-0.082 
[0.577] 
0.035 
[0.825] 
0.062 
[0.690] 
0.050 
[0.748] 
Constant -0.053 [0.910] 
0.323 
[0.639] 
0.018 
[0.980] 
0.027 
[0.970] 
5.277 
[0.267] 
0.074 
[0.821] 
1.848 
[0.384] 
14.497 
[0.104] 
14.485 
[0.081]* 
-14.843 
[0.652] 
Observations 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167  53 53 53 53 53 
Number of 
ifscode 30 30 30 30 30       
R-squared 0.212 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.215  0.530 0.546 0.451 0.582 0.589 
RMSE 5.235 5.236 5.236 5.237 5.235  2.077 2.063 2.268 2.002 2.008 
Note: 1) Inflation and population growth are detrended using quadratic filter. 2) Fixed-effect estimation for OECD and OLS for individual country regressions using annual data. 
3) P-values based on robust t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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